EuroDefense’s Nine (9) Recommendations for the preparation of the White Paper on the future of European Defence
Everything you always wanted to know about the White Paper (but were afraid to ask)
This document from the EURODEFENSE network aims to contribute to the drafting of the White Paper on the future of European Defence, which is indeed a new strategic step. It should be underscored the added value of UK’s integration into the EURODEFENSE network The White Paper should be as comprehensive and ambitious as possible, to take account of the necessarily high degree of urgency while remaining compliant with EU Treaties and ensuring the most efficient possible use of public money.
While it is universally agreed that, in Europe, we need to spend far more and much better, and far more and much better together, we are currently neither spending well nor enough: our inadequate resources are being partly wasted. The White Paper will therefore need to address change of current habits, the self-centered temptations and the many taboos over defence issues. All efforts to deepen defence relations, even if informal, with NATO European nations but non-EU members such as UK or Norway will be much welcome. A reset of our relations with Turkey should be recommended to evaluate if and how this key NATO Member State is prepared for the reinforcement of the European pillar of the Alliance.
Recommendation 1:
Tough choice 1: 300,000 troops + 5,000 soldiers’ operationally ready and creating a European command structure.
The White Paper must capitalise on the excellent Strategic Compass unanimously adopted by the European Council in March 2022, just a few weeks after Putin declared war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
Since this first aggression, historically opposed by Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, the scale and number of the forms of violence, intrusion and threats perpetrated by Putin have increased dramatically. The Strategic Compass focused on the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000 soldiers. This was already not enough even then and too oriented towards crisis management rather than high intensity warfare. In the face of Putin’s endless conventional, hybrid and even nuclear vindictiveness, Europe’s deterrent capacity is embedded in the collective defence of NATO, with the well over 300,000 troops at high readiness decided for the NNM (New NATO Model). Its collective military readiness for high intensity conflict needs to be improved as a matter of urgency, notably through its European component. By the same token, the 5,000-task force must demonstrate its complementary capacities for all types of operations, but notably for out-of-area operations and crisis management. Current threats are many and numerous, and not only from Putin who has effectively put an end of all inhibitions over the use of force in conflict resolution. Therefore, the reality of the defence capability of the European nations lies in their permanent ability to mobilise without delay and to activate together all their military capabilities and their instruments of power across all domains in the face of all types of threat. To this end, the inherent requirements for military mobility are a top priority for EU, NATO and their Member States.
The White Paper should recommend to speed up the set up of this 5,000-strong, highly interoperable and readiness force with strategic mobility requirements. This implies the implementation of appropriate EU operational command and planning means by creating a European Command and Control structure.
The mutual defence provisions put into the Treaty on European Union were focused on crisis management, peace support, and conflict prevention operations conducted by ad-hoc (non-permanent and improvised for every operation decided) command and control elements
In order to address perceived weaknesses in the EU's military capabilities, the Berlin Plus agreements were established with NATO which would provide necessary "assets and capabilities" to support EU operations. But, even when supplemented by NATO assets, the EU's current military command and control capabilities are insufficient for operations beyond the very limited scope of the Petersberg tasks.
The long-standing policy of "no duplication" with NATO requires revision in light of these considerations. Concurrently, the process of "Europeanization" within NATO's command structures should be reinvigorated. This would foster better alignment between NATO and EU military capabilities and command structures, enhancing interoperability and strategic coherence across both organizations.
Also, the internal reporting lines of both the EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff should be rationalised in view of the new demands posed by the potentiality of heavier military operations that the Petersberg tasks for which they were initially conceived.
Therefore, to address the new security challenges and hybrid threats, the EU urgently requires a robust command structure below the European Union Military Committee.This structure would also facilitate the organization and conduct of more complex military exercises than hitherto, as demanded by the new geopolitical circumstances.
In this perspective the EURODEFENSE network has just launched a new EWG called “Strategic European Defence” which will address notably this European Defence Structure issue.
The White Paper should recommend to the Member States to address as soon as possible this key issue.
Recommendation 2:
Tough choice 2: to defend Ukraine now and later.
We are not cobelligerent. But Ukraine is de facto our first line of defence. The allies must step up their military support. The sooner they do this, the better, all the more so in the (not unlikely) event of the Americans cutting back their support: It is time we get our heads out of the sand. We must address ‘our too little, too late’ syndrome. The cost of the necessary support and of our own collective defence will continue to rise for as long as we fail to sufficiently consolidate Ukraine’s capacity to resist its aggressor, who is also our aggressor. European alignment on offering deep strike capacity to Kiev is a must. The White Paper should not aim to be politically correct by eluding the question. And in the event of a ceasefire, Europe and NATO will have to offer security guaranties to a country divested by force, at least temporarily, of 20 % of its territory in violation of the UN charter. The European members of the Alliance must align on this point and advocate together towards Washington. Anything else would simply encourage Putin to use the time to reconstitute his forces as fast as possible and prepare for a further onslaught on Ukraine and other future victims in the vicinity of Russia. A ceasefire without game-changing security guarantees for Ukraine would be gifting Putin the chance to resume hostilities whenever he likes, not necessarily 5 years down the road, as some experts surprisingly predict. Neither Ukraine, nor Europe, nor the Alliance, nor the US can wait for the protection of Article 42.7, when Ukraine joins the EU, or of the Article 5, if and when it becomes a NATO Member.
Furthermore, there are other threats, such as those coming from Africa, Middle East or the Indo Pacific area, that the White Paper must consider.
Recommendation 3:
Tough Choice 3: stronger invitation to Member States to better spend money and to align their answers based on common operational requirements.
Member States are already spending a great deal of money but are not spending it the right way: it is difficult to ask for more funds, if some of the sums already allotted are being misspent, at least in part.
Despite their commitment to do the opposite, through fit-for-purpose instruments such as EDA/PESCO/OCCAR, etc., Member States, have so far (with too few exceptions) failed to agree on common operational requirements and to translate them into grouped acquisitions and cooperative programmes. However, the necessary information for aligning the operationnal requirements of 23 European Allies is already available in the framework of the NATO Defence Planning Process, and should be better leveraged through a new agreement of information sharing between NATO and EU, and by the concerned European Member States themselves, thanks to the EDA. At present, demand for defence equipment in Europe is fragmented and based on national assessments, not always keen or aware of existing European solutions, even partly national/partly European solutions.
This does not imply or encourage for the consolidation of European groups yet necessary to reach and maintain the critical global size of their American competitors, in particular. Moreover, the invaluable cross-border innovation role of the SMEs in the defence supply chains should be highly regarded. However, the success of Airbus, particularly with the military versions of its commercial aircraft, or of MBDA in the missile area is a clear indication of the way we should proceed: programme/consolidation/integration/export with the organisation of European value chains.
The Commission is playing its role, when it enjoins Member States to urgently modify their habits and proposes to reinforce community instruments to incentivize better practices.
Community procurement of large capability enablers much needed at the 27 MS level should be considered. This is similar to the case of space systems like Galileo, Copernicus or IRIS², and of Frontex vessels. These common defence assets have to be procured, managed and maintained within an appropriate European body.
The decision to appoint a Commissioner for Defence and Space is an excellent innovation. However, this cannot and should not relieve Member States of their responsibilities for defence capabilities and industry, as enshrined in the Treaties. But the Commissioner is nevertheless in a position to act as a kind of moral arbitrator, of ombudsman, alerting the right people, the Member States concerned, the college of the Commission, the EU council and the European Parliament and the public opinion, when a Member State fails to live up to its commitment to spending more, better and together. The current situation is unacceptable: Member States have to undertake to change their habits and to agree to being monitored by the Commissioner in this way.
Recommendation 4:
Tough Choice 4: funding, recognising the unavoidable need to resort to Eurobonds and/or EU guarantees
Even with a strong injunction to “spend by far better together”, which represents a game-changer for the behaviour of the individual Member States, with greater vigilance on the part of the Commission, the White Paper cannot elude the tough question of the need to spend by far more boosting the efforts devoted to defence. 2% was the target commonly adopted largely before 2022, a target finally more or less reached but only after considerable delays. It is also important to remind that Allies had agreed that at least 20% of their defence expenditures should be devoted to major new equipment spending, including the associated research and development, and that should remain. Among other similar findings, the Draghi report strongly advocates an increase in the allies’ collective efforts to reach 3%, while the USA is already at 3.5%, Poland is close to 4.7%. Russia has gone from 6 to 9%, in a war economy, which has exhausted its economy in addition to the apparently infinite human sacrifices that war has entailed. The EU was able to adopt the Eurobond solution during the COVID pandemic. Why should it hesitate to do the same in the face of the current military pandemic? Even the so called ‘frugal’ countries are underfunded and were or still often are the furthest from abiding by the current 2% commitment. Investment in the defence sector should be encouraged and considered as ensuring the sustainability of the Member States.
The White Paper needs to be completely upfront and to recommend recourse to Eurobonds, and/or EU guarantees as the main financial contribution to the needed additional defence effort, as long as it ensures the lowest interest rates for EU and MS loans. As an complement to Eurobonds and EU guarantees offered to Public authorities, the EU could issue financial guarantees to investors providing industry with capital for the execution of member state contracts. These guarantees (repayable loans type) would lower the interest rate to the AAA rating of the Union for member states with a lower rating. Specialised for Defence, but similar to the Invest EU guarantees.
This issue should be referred to the European Council.
Recommendation 5:
Tough Choice 5: to achieve the best possible balance, at Member State level, by means of more extensive and sincere operational and procurement coordination, between:
-short term urgent requirements and preparations for the future,
-quantity and quality,
-low cost and high-end innovative solutions,
-defence assets of common interests of the 27 (similar to Galileo and IRIS2) and the decentralized equipment of the national armed forces based on aligned operational requirements,
-the amount of additional money to be spent in common, together (in cooperation at 2 or more member states) or still on a national basis,
-what already exists in Europe, solutions in preparation or to be prepared and cases where procurement from outside sources cannot be avoided in the absence of immediately available European solutions.
The White Paper should address these issues and invite the Member States and the European Council to set the adequate cursor for each of these.
Recommendation 6:
Tough choice 6: to focus the necessary and welcome added value of the Commission on supporting the MS in helping them to cooperate more extensively and efficiently, while not trying to take their responsibilities for them.
The much-needed fresh money mentioned above should be used by the MS not only to reinforce their operational capabilities but also to increase the Commission’s budget., as needed for incentivising enough the cooperations and support European Defence Programmes of Common Interest (EDPCI) for the 27 Member States.
It remains true, however, that the Commission needs more money to properly exercise its role as a catalyst and to fund priority common defence assets.
Recommendation 7:
Tough choice 7: reinforcing the Alliance is contingent on reinforcing the EDTIB
The White Paper should make it perfectly clear that, if Europe is to better assume its defence responsibilities in the Alliance, it will need to increase efforts to fortify EDTIB. As we increase and optimize our defence expenditures in the face of evolving security challenges, it Is crucial to ensure that our European technological and industrial base is competitive and capable of providing the military capabilities we need, and reduce reliance on external actors, aligning with our overarching objectives of enhancing our security and ensuring our strategic autonomy. US engagement regarding the ongoing aggression of Russia against Ukraine, Europe, the Alliance and ultimately the US themselves, is vital also for the US. But it is only fair that Europe should better assume its own responsibilities and share the burden, in the words of the famous saying. The European countries cannot successfully reinforce the Alliance’s European pillar without reinforcing their EDTIB, as they are intrinsically linked.
Recommendation 8:
Tough choice 8: to obtain the necessary commitment at MS and Commission levels to reinforce Europe’s industrial strengths to reach and maintain them at the necessary scale at the world level
The Draghi report was extremely clear in flagging up the need to consolidate the European Defence Industry. The same is true of the Letta and Niinistö reports. It is now time for the Commission to embrace, without any more restriction, this critical objective, while also providing adequate supply chain and start-up support. European clusters of excellence can only be based on a complete chain of competitiveness from start-ups to prime contractors. Competitiveness must be measured at global level, i.e. worldwide. The European States have developed adequate instruments like EDA, PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) and OCCAR, which demonstrates full ability to conduct European programmes. However, these instruments have been underused mainly due to a lack of strong incentives from governments. This has proved counterproductive to Europe’s welcome ambition of achieving greater autonomy and has resulted in a massive influx of procurement from outside, notably from the United States: according to an IRIS survey, 63% of the EU’s recent defence purchases have been for American solutions.
To put it in a nutshell: The European pillar of the Alliance is in a sub-critical state in terms of both military and industrial readiness. All existing instruments must be properly used before setting about creating others, with the risk of bureaucratic duplication. Strengthening EDTIB should also be done by using European funding in higher Technology Readiness Levels that will facilitate innovation and improve efficiency in the “concept-prototype-production” cycle.
NATO standards are the key to greater interoperability among member nations' forces. Through EDA and a more targeted PESCO approach, it should also be possible to identify areas for future joint R&D.
An expanded but better focused European Defence Fund (EDF) should enable the EU and its Member States, in coordination with NATO and EU-based R&D institutions, to choose defence solutions available on the European market in the future. At the development stage, the EDF cannot afford to spread its subsidies too widely and too thinly. It must adapt its processes to cater to the absolute necessity of reinforcing Europe’s strengths in the face of global competition. It also needs to support the badly needed consolidation. EDF should also promote highly agile short-cycle innovation as well as effective follow-up towards production and implementation.
More generally, any financial support from the EU budget must be targeted towards the EDTIB and towards producing and making available EU defence products, looking ahead to long-term prospects. It has to encourage Member States to make long-term commitments to supporting European industry, through joint procurement and cooperation programmes, securing the European capability to use and modify its defence products. It should be emphasized the need for promoting a certain systemic order between the various EU existing funds with regard to their purpose, without this necessarily implying their aggregation or amalgamation.
Recommendation 9:
Tough choice 9: creating a European defence culture
Defence relies above all on the feeling shared by all citizens of the necessity to defend themselves. The defence feeling usually shared at the level of the Nation must be brought at the citizens and European levels, based on the perception of a common destiny, of which the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union are the expression.
A European defence culture based on a European common strategic culture, should trigger the defence cooperative programmes, from their design to development, production and procurement.
Defence, in all its aspects, must be made more attractive to European citizens, particularly young people.
‘Total Defence’ is the motto adopted by most of the Nordic and Baltic States: it’s right, demanding but compulsory.
The White Paper should encourage education to European total defence posture, with focus on territorial defence in the EU, notably by promoting appropriate national and multinational trainings in European and National formation centres.
