OPINION: An initiative for a permanent European Defence Coalition
What Europe needs today for its security is self-confidence, defence capability, solidarity and unity of defence policy, command and execution. This requires unanimity in political decision-making and a centrally managed defence organisation. Apart from regional cooperation, the European Union, NATO and an ad hoc "Coalition of the Willing" are now the main security structures in Europe.
Many countries participate in several of these three groups. Most of these countries have committed themselves to comply with Art.5 (NATO) and Art.42.7 (EU Treaty of Lisbon). Both articles suggest the intention to solidarity; An attack on one of them is an attack on all and obliges all to assistance. In practice, both articles give participants room to refrain from effective support, although Art.42.7 is somewhat more firmly stated than NATO Art.5. Recent history has clearly demonstrated that US support cannot be counted on in the event of an external attack on a European NATO or EU state. This also applies to some European member states.
In short: in practice, at the moment and in the near future, one cannot count on unlimited solidarity from both NATO and EU member states; there is no unity of policy, no adequate political decision-making, and for an autonomous European defence there is no operational and command organisation despite the existence of NATO, the EU and the Coalition of the Willing (CoW).
A possible route to a European Defence Coalition
Currently,
the candidates for the CoW are almost all EU countries plus Turkey, Canada,
Australia, N. Zealand, Iceland and the UK. The majority of these are also NATO
members. The CoW was established to support a possible Ukraine-Russia ceasefire
or peace agreement and is therefore a temporary "single purpose"
alliance. Almost all CoW partners have already committed themselves in the past
to mutual support in the event of an attack on European territory by means of a
solidarity agreement (NATO, Art.5 or EU Art.42.7). But that is no guarantee.
Based on the intention to guarantee Ukraine's position in the long term, the
involvement of members of the CoW will in practice not have to be temporary,
but permanent. This implies that the agreement to participate will also have to
be permanent in nature, independent of changes of government. The guarantee of
Ukraine's independence is practically a guarantee for the defence of Europe.
Because, if Ukraine falls, the CoW will be forced to defend Europe,
collectively and in solidarity. Anticipating this is politically difficult, but
logical and strategically sensible.
A collective, reciprocal defence agreement for European territory.
A
start on clarifying and consolidating the intentions of CoW participants could
take the form of a Pact or Treaty. It reaffirms that the parties commit to
assisting each other, permanently and by all available means, in the event of
an external existential threat to European territory and the society of the
participating state. These threats could be military as well as hybrid in
nature.
This
should be at least as powerful and binding as the EU art. 42.7. The question is
whether this assistance also applies to European states that are not part of
the CoW. My preference is not to promise that assistance, as an incentive to
still participate in the CoW.
In fact, participation requires a reaffirmation of already existing obligations for most participants, but the essential advantage of this procedure is that governments of member states once again explicitly commit themselves to organizing the defense of Europe collectively and permanently, not only "de jure", but also "de facto" and thus without an "opt-out" clause. The starting point of the cooperation is that each participating member state agrees to the goal, method and commitment to the CoW. Of course, this commitment will not alter after changes of government and policy in member states. The CoW will be pre-mandated by the member states on the basis of scenarios for the defence of Europe. The CoW should not be confused with a “European army”. For a European army long-term cooperation, integration, standardisation and the creation of new common capabilities will be necessary, but the CoW now urgently requires a joint defence strategy and commitment for the participating countries.
Role of the EU
If sufficient and important NATO/EU member states join this CoW, we can speak of a European Defence Coalition. This EDC is independent, but aligns with the EU and is somewhat similar to the EMU, which also does not include all EU states. The EU is now also providing support for the European defence industry. It is desirable that the EU will also support the CoW/EDC, both financially and industrially, including for the European CoW members that are not part of the EU. For non-European Associate Members, the European Commission's current partnership arrangements can serve as an example.
Role of NATO
In addition, the EDC will be the European pillar in NATO. The EDC with its European defence mandate and the commitment of its members, represents its participating states within NATO. NATO will then act as the operational organisation of the EDC, with the task of leading the defence efforts from SACEUR. Support from non-European partners such as the US is of course very welcome, but it should also be able to function without it. It is logical that SACEUR for the defence of Europe is permanently led by a European commander. The US should not be in a position to block decision-making on European defence. After all, the mutual Atlantic aspect of NATO is currently hard to find.
Political decision-making
Finally,
decision-making should be structured both at the political top of CoW/EDC, as
well as at the political top of NATO. It is obvious that the political
leadership of CoW is also represented in NATO's political decision-making. The
leadership of CoW/EDC could be entrusted to the heads of government of three or
four larger participating countries, possibly on a rotating basis. This could
be a Presidium, and could function as the European Security Council. Other
participating countries could be represented in constituencies. The most
important thing is that the common starting point in the creation of the
CoW/EDC, namely the joint defence of Europe and its territory, is accepted,
supported and laid down by all in a pre-mandate
based on the possible crisis scenarios. This avoids possible vetoes and
encourages speed of decision-making at a time of crisis. It is clear that a
country that joins, knows that by issuing a pre-mandate, it is obliged to make
its defense effort when the presidium asks for it. Those who do not
participate, will not influence the process.
How to get started?
We
can conclude that there are plenty of ideas about European defence, but given
the urgency of the problem, and the complications in the realisation of
alternatives, the current proposal is practical, feasible and perhaps
politically acceptable within the existing organisations NATO, EU and CoW. One
or more of the larger participating countries of the CoW will have to start the
formation of the CoW and draw up a founding document. There is a secretariat
which, after reinforcement, can serve as a pivot for the construction of the
EDC organisation.
The
big question is: Who will take the lead? Will a leading European government
support and propagate this proposal?
Possibly with one or more partner countries? Does it have to come from
the NGOs? The EDNL network?
Iric A. van Doorn
Advisor EDNL board
12 january 2026
Illustration: AI generated. Individuals are fictional.
